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Since the rise of Coimaunism in China, several questions
have been asked about the factors which made it possible.
Communism gained support of the Chinese people in a movement
which stemmed from the rebellions of 1831-1832* In 1831 an
uprising occurred because of suppressions imposed upon peasants
by propertied land-owners. This movement was contemporary to
other universal attempts of the common man to assert himself.
During the "Age of Jackson" many reforms were initiated in the
United States in behalf of the common mn. In England the
reforms of 1832 extended to the people a more equitable
opportunity to determine the affairs of the country. The ErencJ
were given their reforms in 1832. Chinese peasants were the
last to witness the culmination of their long wanted innovations
Their realization and hopes for Nationalism, Democracy and
Livelihood were given to them by the Chinese Communists.
They were a group of nationalist Chinese citizens led by
Mao tze-tung. This body of citizens, greatly disturbed over
the insults imposed upon the national integrity of China by
foreigners during the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, had the suppor
of Dr. Sun*s blessings in that this body or party of citizens
sou^t to carry out the will of the founder of the Chinese
Republic.
Mass support was gained by the Communist. This is why it
was possible for them to succeed in placing millions of Chinese
under their control. Peasajits, under Chiang, and other Chinese
vflio were interested in a strong state found themselves believed
incapable to rule or defend China by Westerners.
Westerners encroached upon the sovereignty of China and
belittled her integrity. The purpose of this paper is to
ascertain the extent to which the West exploited China, the
conditions of the peasants and the ill-rule of Chiang which
gave rise to Communism. A form of government that is state
controlled, yet, democratic by Western interpretations gave
China in 1949 a de facto nationalistic government founded upon
popular control guaranteeing to the people land which it took
them more than a century to obtain.
Materials such as the most current reports of Communist
activity in China were and are limited. Limitation is due to
non-recognition of Communist China by the United States.
Great reliance was upon historical publications such as books,
newspapers and magazines as well as the tJ. S. State Department
document, commonly called the "China white paper." Hence,
any conclusions drawn were based upon history as it was written
before the rise of Communism as reflected in government estab¬
lished in 1949.
The writer wishes to state that the Communist came to
power because they were (l) anti-foreign in that they wanted
China nationalistic, (2) they gave the masses the right and
privilege to participate in government, and (3) they gave the
peasants land to call their own. By doing so they did more
lii
to implement the legacies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen than did the
followers of Chiang Kai-shek.
There is no intent on the part of the writer to proTe
that Dr. Sun was a member of the Communist Party "Moscow Style,"
though he was once a Communist. The purpose, however, is to
show how the Communists used his program to take control of
the Chinese Government.
The Communist party was led hy Mao tze-tung who was a
brilliant scholar and administrator* Chu Teh led the Communist
Armies. He was from a wealthy family but wanted a more equal
distribution of profits. Chlna^s nationalist government was
led by Chiang Kai-shek who is well known as the bulwark against
the Communist since 1926* Both parties are dealt with through¬
out chapters I, II, and III.
In chapter I a historical account of the chaos in China
from 1898 to 1949 is given. The legacies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen
are interpreted in chapter II while the reforms made by the
Communist are accounted for in chapter III,
CHA.PTER I
CHUIA PROM 1898 TO 1949
The "Red Bandits" have conquered China.^ It was done
by dei“ault of the Nationalist partyThis party lost the
confidence of the people when it failed to accept democratic
•z
techniques of government advocated for the people.*^ The
conquest of China by the "Red Bandits" has placed more than
470,000,000 people under the Communist Regime.^ China’s
people were misled and betrayed by General Chiang Kai-shek.
His leadership of the Kuomintang v/as one according to his
personal views. Hence, the people gs.ve support to another
political party that had insisted upon the implementation of
Democracy, a legacy, of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.^ The hope for
modern China was embodied in the Pounder of the Chinese
Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. His program for modernizing China
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iDegan in 1920 with proposals to reorganize the Kuornintang*
Before the rise of Comnunism in China is discussed it
is necessary to do the follov/ing: (l) define Chinese Coirimunism,
and (2) relate the factors that were responsible for the
failure of the nationalist Party. The latter of the two must
he in historical retrospect in order to relate better the
chaos which the people experienced.
Communism, in China, was a revolt of the peasants against
the powers of government.^ It was a movement that had its own
laws, army and officials of government. In this movement the
people sou^t a change in the ruling structure of their govern¬
ment as evidenced by the fa.ct that the Communist put into
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effect their policies each time an area was captured.
China, before the announcement of Br. Sun’s three
principles, was divided as follows: Japan held Formosa and
concessions a-t Port Arthur. Germany was in Shantung; Great
Britain controlled Hong Eong with trade ri^ts throu^out China.
The Unites States maintained the "most-favored-nation clause."
It was merely that China could not grant to one occupying
power anything that she didn’t cede others. By insistence
upon that clause the United States maintained the "Open Boor"
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policy in China. There was no Chinese government powerful
enou^ to discharge the affairs of a modern state.^ This
fact was realized hy Japan when she issued her ’’Twenty-one
Demands.^ These factors preceded the conditions which
further aggravated the situation after Dr. Sun made public
his legacies.
In February 1912, the Manchu Dynasty abdicated. A
Republican form of government was established over which Dr.
Sun was elected President before the edict of abdication was
signed.^ .The constitution that was adopted provided for an
assembly of two houses. Representatives to these houses
were elected during the latter part of 1912.® Both houses
met early in 1913. Two powerful factions, north and south,
emerged and made their intentions known. The Southern party
was composed of Liberals and radica,ls. It was led by Dr.
Sun Yat-sen. The other comprised mostly of conservatives
was led by Yuan Shih-kai. Friction between these two groups
arose even while the constitution was being drafted. The
Southerners, who practicall3r wrote it, were under Dr. Sun’s
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influence.^ The constitution gave limited powers to the
president. When the Assembly convened in 1913 the Radicals
3
were in control.
neither of the parties could permit the other to control
the Presidency. Dr. Sim and Yuan agreed that the former would
run for the presidency and v;hen elected resign in favor of
the latter.^ Students and foreign governments opposed the
strategy but Dr. Sun resigned with the hope that China would
be unified.^ His resignation on February 13, 1912 left the
Assembly still divided but Yuan was China’s first Republican
president to take office. Simultaneously an assassination
of a Radical leader occurred in Shan^ai. Yuan’s government
ft
was charged with the murder.
In the summer of 1913 President Yuan commanded a Southern
military governor to resign his office, northern troops were
sent to enforce the order. This brou^t forth armed resistemce
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^Tanking, the original Southern capital of Sun’s Republican
government before he gave ascendency to Yuan, was captured.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan in the hope that China v/ould
be unified.^ When Hanking fell the Republic of China v;as
governed by Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan had power then to dissolve
Parliament at will. The United States and several South
American Republics recognized the government v/hich came into
p
existence by Yhan’s coup.
When the Chinese Republic gained a measure of internation¬
al recognition V/orld War I was being fou^t. Japan declared
war on GernEiny in August, 1914. Germany had extra-territoral
privileges in the province of Shantung. Japan, v/ithin three
months, assisted by British nava.l forces had captured Tsingtao.
This was Germany's stron^old in the Orient. Cons sequent ly,
Japan was installed in Germany's Shantung province. The
United Sta.tes informed Britain that she insisted upon non¬
interference - that the efforts of Japan were to return to
China her province* A hope for the modern China as proposed
by Dr. Sun was challenged by a civil war in 1913 and an attack
by Japan in 1914. China could not defeat the foreign invaders.
China vmis a neutral nation in that she had not entered the war
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with the allies against Germany. The aggressive acts of
Japan placed her neutrality in great jeopardy.^
Japan had been given comfort by the United States in
her campaigns against China, She served her Twenty-one
Demands to China on January 18, 1915. If China had accepted
them, the nation would have become a vassal of Japan, They
in essence, prevented China from doing anything without the
consent of Ja,pan. These demands would ho^ve extended Japanese
control over Chinese social and political institutions. China
was helpless. The United States informed Japan that her
demands were inconsistent with her previous announcements
p
concerning the sovereignty of China, The American Secretary
of State, Williams Jennings Bryan, warned Japan that the United
States would regard with disfavor her insistence to take
control of Chinese political and social institutions. Japan
then was not able to make China accept the demands but forced
a revision which the United States refused to recognize.^
In 1916 Yuan tried to restore the monarchy,^ His hope
was that a son could become ruler after him. The attempt was
severely criticized by peasants. Dilatory strategy was used
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when the proposal was submitted to the people* Another revolt
was discovered under consideration by the war-lords, follow¬
ing this attempt, rival governments were established at Canton,
each claiming to be constitutional. Parliament was dissolved.
War-lords allied themselves with political parties, then,
waged war against the Central government. The people were
hungry and confused. They followed war-lords for protection
and food. These war-lords or generals were interested only
in their personal aggrandizements.^
Yuan’s attempt to restore the monarchy was a last check
on the decaying regime. In April of 1916 a group of five
Southern provinces established a confederacy. On September 10,
1917 the government was moved from Peking to Canton, Pr. Sun
Y8.t-sen was elected President,^
The bourgeoisie worked in accord with the new regime to
rid China of foreigners. Students returned from study in the
West with ideas which they sou^t to implement. Bankers
organized and programs were initiated to assist the manufactur¬
ers, All groups and parties worked under Dr. Sun to effect
the program of the confederacy*
When Dr. Sun became head of the confederacy the Kuomintang








Yuan Shih-kai while Dr. Stm was outside of China. Attention
must he given to this political party because it v/as the
focal point of departure for the use of Communism in China.
After 1924 all techniques and philosophy were changed. It
was done because Dr. Sun was refused aid by the Vest. In a
period of crisis when assistance was needed he called upon
Russia. Russia sent Michael M. Borodin in August, 1923.^
Invaluehle aid was given by Borodin as one of Sun’s architects.
Dr. Sun confided in him and his influence permeated the
Eaomintang.
The Kiominta.ng was originally a tool of the middle class
2
because of Dr. Sun’s lack of confidence in peasant rule.
Military men found it useful also. Despite these evils some
peasants came into the party by 1919. Dr. Sun tried to v;in
more peasant support. He proposed reorganization of the
Kiomintang so that it approximated Lenin’s party in Russia.^
The Conservatives split ranks in October, 1920. This break
made the President more determined to win mass support.
Changes even more radical were proposed. In 1924 he called
a convention to legalize the reorganization proposals. The
Ilaomintang emerged entirely different from his original
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conception of it in that it was liberalized to permit
peasant participation.^
Chinese political thinkers thou^t class warfare some¬
what non-essential. Their thinking permeated the party.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen used his influence to declare class warfare
essential. Glasses were to be abolished.^
The revised Nationalist party invited people of peasant
origin to participate in the revolution. Russians were
brought to the South China government at Canton to help shape
the new policy. Reforms were initiated by the Russian
Communists. These reforms were: (1) putting policy into
colorful catchwords that would appeal to the masses, and (2)
the techniques of arousing groups to S3rmpathize were improved.^
Sun Yat-sen was shown the necessity of having an array.
He knew virtually nothing about the militaryi According to
Professor Arthur Holcombe, the Bolshevists taught the Chinese
how to improve their military strategy on the field in order
to defeat the enemies.® The enemies were the conservatives
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nationalist armies set out to capture the reactionary north
because the conservatives had entrenched themselved there.^
Dr. Sun died in l-larch, 1925. One year later Chiang staged
a coup at Canton and became leader of the Kuomintang. He
was a member of the Centrist bloc which was a less radical
faction inside of the Kuomintang. The new leader, in the
absence of Borodin, expelled some radical leaders. The
Communists were, like the Centrist bloc, only one faction of
the Kaomintang. They formed the left in the party.^
A break was decreed by the nationalists from the
Communists in 1927, The Russian Communists gave new meaning
to the legacies in that they interpreted them for the masses.
"When the break occurred the people allied themselves with the
Chinese Communists who seemed closer to them. With the
technique of playing upon needs and using students to incite
4differences the Communists gained support of the masses,
Chiang had lost the peasant support which the Communists










Yet, he continued his advances into the North leading a
group of "Moderates” who opposed the Corarnunists.^
General Chiang in 1927 changed a decision of the party
in order to move southward to Shan^ai.^ By doing so he In-
vited friction from Japanese troops in Shantung*
Madame Sun Yat-sen denounced Chiang and the faction he
led which was called the Iltomintang* She told the reaction¬
aries in the party that the program(Democracy, Nationalism
and Livelihood) of Dr. Sun would triumph in the end.^ She
warned Chiang’s party, the JPornintang, that it could not he
5
called the follower of Dr. Sun.
The political situation inside of China grew worse.
Japan, in 1931, was definitely in Manchuria. Manchuria
was Industrially undeveloped hut the evident capture of the
area hy Japan left agricultural China in a critical condition.*^
China had found it necessary to ask for peace when Japan
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invaded her territory.^ The Kfe-nchurian incident of 1931
gave Japan more of Chinese territory because she took
possession of the Liaotung Peninsula during the Russo-Japanase
¥ar of 1904-*05.^
Conditions for the Comraunists grew v/orse also. It
became necessary for them to leave the South China a.rea. In
October, 1934, the long Ifeirch began.^ The forces of Dr. Sun
changed position with the reactionaries v/ho had Chiang under
control. Chiang’s forces fou^t what they thouglit vjas Com¬
munist troops. But they soon discovered that the Communist
forces had begun to move into the northwest.^ They set out
with 100,000 troops and concluded the march with 50,000.^
At Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 Japan began her co^mpaigns
to neutralize the China sea coast. When this attempt was
made by Japan there was a grov/ing state of political and
social evils which mde conditions for peasants terrible.
Exploitations, indignities and forms of insecurity
1
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persisted until 1944 when it was evident that Chiang’s
government should attempt to improve them.^
Despite the intolerable state of affairs in the Chinese
nation, Chiang manifested more interest in getting nationalist
troops into position to fi^t the Communist than he was in
freeing China from Japan. This deceit and strategy developed
early after the Communist had won peasant support in their new
O
Shensi area. His armies carried with them martial lav/ and
public denials of freedom. After World War II the
Generalissimo tried to destroy the Communist. Supporters of
his leadership began to break rank. He would yield to no
demands of the Communists in their attempts to unify China.^
Landed estates were still markets of peasant exploitation.
These v;ere conditions which confronted Chiang after World War
II. These were the factors which made easy the rise of
Communism.
One can ask two major questions: (1) What were the
legacies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen? and (2) How did the Communist
come to power? The two questions are dealt w'ith in the
following chapters. Special attention is given to the
interpretation of Dr. Sun’s legacies in order to show how
the Chinese people accepted the thing called "Communism."
"China Warned to be Democratic," Hew York Times, April
15, 1944, p. 4.
2
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CHA.PTER II
IIA.TIOHA.LISM, DEMOCRACY, AlID LIVELIHOOD
Both the Comrnunist and the nationalist Parties declared
that each was implementing the legacies of Dr* Sun Yat-sen*
Retrospectively, one can see that the nationalist party had
placed China in a state of chaos* -Chiang Kai-shek was trying
to destroy Communism when Dr« Sun called it the ideal of
Livelihood*^ However, Dr* Sun later cnanged his interpretations
in their entirety.
These doctrines which Loth parties swore they were im¬
plementing v;ere nationalism, Democracy s.nd Livelihood* Each
of these embodied a theory and a program.
When Dr. Sun began to explain his doctrines, he was
confronted with a Chinese people whose heritage was four
3
thousand years of humanistic living. Their concepts of the
state were based upon the ideas of Confucius* These are
expressed, in part, by the following quotation:
The ancients who wished to preserve the clear
character of the people of the world would first
order their na-tional life. Those who wished to
order their national life would first regulate their
1 ■ -
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family life. Those who wished to regulate their
family life would first cultivate their personal
lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal
lives would first set their hearts right. Those who
wished to set their hea^rts ri£dit would first make
their wills sincere. Those v;ho wished to make their
wills sincere first achieve true knov/ledge. The
achieving of true knowledge depended upon the in¬
vestigation of things.
¥hen things are investigated, then true knowledge
is achieved; when true knowledge is achieved, then the
will hecomes sincere; when the will is sincere, then
the heart is set ri^t; when the heart is set ri^it,
then the personal life is cultivated, then the family
life is regulated; when the family life is regulated,
then the national life is orderly; when the national
life is orderly, then there is peace in the world.
The foregoing was taught to Chinese students for
generations. To them "Rule “by Virtue" was the only thing
that could order nationa.! life. "Rule by virtue" is rule
without legislature or judiciary - it v/as based upon hi^
moral character and Inowledge vested in the one who ruled.
They looked upon the government as the family unit writ large.
Its relationship was similar to that of father and household.
2
The ruler was father 8.nd the people \^ere the children.
Nationalism for Sujn entailed v/resting from the foreigners
China for the Chinese. The philosoi^y of Confucius as tau^t
in schools was foreseen by Dr. Sun as a weapon to make China
a sta.te of vassals. He believed that foreign rulers with good
treatment could nialce the Chinese so loyal until they would
1




orget their being a Chinese race.^
Dr, Sun used "racism" as a weapon to unite the Chinese*
'.e advocated making the Chinese even more race conscious
han the Eturopeans were during the middle ages. Sun became
‘adically a Chinese, so did many of hig immediate followers.
Ills became his prime mover which he used to inspire China
2
,0 rise up and assert her hegemony over Asia.
Consistently, he said "... if we want to save China and
%
to preserve the Chinese race, we must preach ^Nationalism."
(Towhere in his speeches on nationalism did he emphasize any¬
thing more than the Chinese race. China, he said, was menaced
md oppressed ethnically, politically and economically,
ethnically, whites would crowd Chinese people off the earth.
Politically, Chinese dependencies have been alienated by
ATestemers and Japan. China was at the mercj'- of anj?- military
aation that wanted to attack. It was a temporary deadlock
between the conquering powers rather than the strength of
China that prevented the radical subjection of China.^
Eoreigners in the nineteenth century were in a position
to bully the Chinese government. Britain had no trouble
getting labor auxiliaries in Canton to fight e.gainst the
^
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imperial government at Peking in 1860; Chinese served
foreign enemies of China at various times as a quasi-military
constabulary. This was disunity and danger for China. China
needed a strong state based not upon Confucian doctrines of
the family but upon human force which builds a state.
”... ITo state has been built up without force.
Because of China’s lack of force she he-s lost territory to
Britain, France and Japan. China lost Burma and Annam without
much opposition. She offered a little opposition before
2
giving up Annam.
Japan was once a small weak nation. But she used western
techniques and grew to be one of the powerful nations,. Her
development was by force.^ Since China was so weak the West
had reduced its political pressure only to use economic
4
pressure. These economic forces could be used against China
because foreigners controlled Chinese customs. Even the
Chinese people depended upon foreign banks and had no confi¬
dence in native banks. China needed tariffs and customs for








iT development.^ Her customs and tariffs were fixed “by
ireign powers.^
Force was the only thing that enabled Britain to succeed,
jr famous expression "Might is right" meant that fighting
)r aggrandizement v;as just.
If there were force then China should have done like
idia, resort to non-cooperation. A form of force against
igland was used. These he also advocated for Ckina. They
sre: (l) refuse to work for foreigners, (2) refuse to he
Dreign slaves, (3) refuse to purchase foreign goods, (4)
itronize and use native goods, (5) sever relationship with
4
Dreigners, and (6) stop using foreign hank notes.
In governmental administration Dr. Sim wanted a
epresentative government. He v/aiited it strong enou^ to
ithstand foreign bullies. His proposal for the estahlish-
ent of a strong centra.1 government included a five power
heck: (l) Legislative Yuan, (2) Executive Ylian, (3) Judicial
uan, (4) Control Yuan, and (5) Examination Yuan. The structure
esenhled that of the V/est with similar cliecks and balances,
ut Sun wanted China to be different so that the Control and









auditing.^ The Examination Yuan was to determine on a
p
competitive basis the officials of the Central government.'^
Despite the fact that China was taken from the M&nchus,
built upon racism and governed by a strong central govern¬
ment (in theory) it was necessary to return to the old
knowledge.
A return to the old wisdom and knowledge did make the
Chinese see their contributions to civilization. It gave new
birth to their original creative genius. Dr. Sun pointed out
the three divisions of contributions} (l) superiority of
Chinese in the field of the social sciences, (2) versatility
of Chinese inventions, and (3) national wealth in labor
capacity.^ These gave the Chinese wealth - a form of social
reorganization which meant to them the same as liberty to
Europeans.^
H'ationalism for China as envisioned by Dr. Sun meant:
(l) pride for China by Chinese, (2) a state powerful enou^
to govern the country, (3) development of creative Chinese
minds, and (4) a national respect of Chinese for Chinese
that would win the nation international recognition and
1 ^ ^ ■ — —











The second plank of the Three Peoples' Principles was
Democracy. Democracy was the ideal which could not be
immediately realized. Sun's conception of Democracy was
different from that of the Vest. Chinese democracy was an
indirect concept wherein rulers felt themselves self-appointed
guardia-ns of the people's welfare.^ Western democracy may
be referred to as activities of the rulers based upon the
v/ishes of the governed. Under democracy Dr. Sun wanted to
curb liberty. It was "how ri^tly to rule, and rightly to
obey."'^ To Sun the Chinese people had too much liberty.
They could move in and out of groups wherever they desired.^
He criticized the belief that China had no individual
freedom. Liberty consisted of being able to move in and have
freedom of action inside of an organized group.® There was
liberty in the old family organization. But there was too
7
much liberty. China needed more liberty for the state. His
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purpose was to sacrifice individual liberty to effectively
organize a strong Chinese state
Emphasis was laid on sovereignty. "It is power 8.nd
authority extended to the area of the state." Here Dr.
Sun applied democracy in the Western sense to the state and
not the individual. Too much liberty for persons permitted
foreign oppression and exploitation. "Yet, the finest thing
for China would be an all powerful government in the employ
of all the people and working for the welfare of all the
people." But the Chinese people for generations had no
control over their affairs and to give them control without
direction was futile.^
Where there was no discipline of peoples in a society
there was no order. Without order by government a nation is
weak. Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted first union of the people under
Nationalism. The,union would be an expression of the power
of the people - an organ throu^ which the liberty of the
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Powers of the people were to be exercised by democratic
means as interpreted by Westerners. Since Sun believed from
the factors above that liberty of the nation and power of
the people were the same, the association, therefore, 6f
Nationalism and Democracy within the Three People’s Principles
was the most coherent discussion of the Legacies as a whole.
The right of the people to depose the Manchus was part of a
world-tide liberation. It was only the inevitable ri^t of
the people to govern themselves. The Chinese leader showed
similar parallels in the Communist doctrines and tactics.^
However, he did not construct a system of dialectical material¬
ism nor economic determinism to support his advocacy of a
change.'^
China had to pass through stages which were similar to
revolution, dictatorship and rule by the proletariat. These
stages were a change from force to theocracy, to monarchy
and, then, to democracy. Sun pointed with emphasis at the
breakdown of great empires such as Germany and Russia. Then
he saw changing from force to democracy as an inevitable which
man must realize that he cannot escape. This differed from








democracy upon the economy and society a-s well as upon the
government. The stages through which China must pass v/ere
used to show that China could not accept democracy "by V/estern
design. It must he unique and Chinese. This unique and
revolutionary interpretation of democracy antedated the
Russian revolution,^ It was designed to have a class govern
for the msses.
As an instrument to effect his program Rr. Sun used the
Euomintang, because he had no faith in each citizen’s ability
to rule. Consequently he divided the citizenry into three
groups: (l) geniuses who are possessors of intelligence and
ability. Their duty was to create new ideas, invent and
achieve; (2) follov/ers v/hose duty v/as to follov; the lead of
the thinkers; and (3) the unthinkers who must follow in-
structions. These three classes were present in politics.
There were creators and inventors of new political ideas,
the followers, and those who must be instructed. Sun’s be¬
lief v/as that intelligence in a democracy rather than property
was the basis for class organization.^
This class strata showed that the imsses v;ho ruled did
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constitution* they could make their wishes known* There would
he for these comraon people the initiative, referendum, election
and recall. They would get the benefits of the governing
body without'cost. The Chinese of a common class, then,
became stockholders in the affairs of the nation with a board
of directors caring for their affairs. After the people were
given control the geniuses could not rely upon an ill-informed
people to run China. The power of the people had to be channel¬
ed throu^ the activity of the state.^
Nationalism and d.emocracj'' could not be achieved without
Livelihood. It is the primary function of the government to
assure its people of the maximum material welfare possible
under prevailing physical conditions. No government merits
existence if these basic reo^uirements are not fulfilled.
Political leadership should aim always at the constant improve¬
ment of the economic conditions, to spread economic benefits
and make the nation healthy. These factors to Sun Yat-sen
meant as much as nationalism or freedom for the state. Hence,
Livelihood therefore may be called socialism or statism by
2
Westerners *
Livelihood was the most controversial of Lr. Sun’s Three
Principles. Dr. Sun deemed Livelihood the most important of
Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals, p. 139.
Cf. Linebarger, op. cit.. p. 110.
2
Gung Hsing Wang, op« cit.« p. 72.
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his legacies. He gave special emphasis to the necessity of a
large number of Chinese having the “basic things in life.
The interpretation of history was based upon consumption and
not on production.^
Livelihood meant a complete revolution of the economic
orderIt was the main theme of socialism.^ It appeared
to Dr. Sun that the West had progressed rapidly in the past
because of four programs: (1) social and industrial reforms,
(2) public ownership of transportation and communication,
(3) direct taxation, and (4) socialized distribution of
property and public facilities. Within the program of social
and industrial reforms there were powers given to the govern¬
ments which enabled them to improve the working man*s health
and education. Such reforms gave a higher rate of output.
By centralizing control of public utilities production and
distribution were enhanced. If individuals were given these
powers indefinitely monopolies would be created. Serious
difficulties would confront a population. Big Western business
men were cited as having long ago been put under governmental
control. China needed direct taxation so that big business
would not enjoy all of the profits while peasants worked and
_
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paid the taxes. ■'Vhen socialized distribution came into
existence, merchant distribution with its oppressions ceased
to exist* Government did a better job either by control or
supervision*^
The realization of a plenty for all under Livelihood was
to be achieved by (l) equalization of land ownership, and (2)
regulation of capital* Landed classes were to be broken up
and capital was to be given to all. This was to give richness
to the Chinese people, hence, making China a powerful nation*
Her people would have a supply of the basic necessities and
would be in support of governmental programs* Livelihood
would not enable the people to enjoy nationalism and Democracy
alone - it would give jobs and hasten the sturcture of a
3
powerful race-nation*
Dr* Sun contended that man*8 happiest period in history
was the period of the barter system which followed the age
of warfare with beast. After the collapse of this system a
few men took all of the resources and other men became slaves.
This struggle, according to Dr. Sun, would be settled only










has Lenin been attacked by the Powers? Because he dared to
say that the people of the world are divided into two classes -
the twelve hundred fifty millions and the two hundred fifty
millions. iThe former group was oppressed by the latter.
That movement was in “defiance of nature
Livelihood, therefore, was a program designed to: (1)
introduce social and economic reforms, (2) nationalize trans¬
portation and communications, (3) introduce direct taxation,
and (4) cause to exist socialized distribution and cooperative
societies*
Dr. Sun Yat-sen cannot be called a capitalist because
of his emi^asis on state control or supervision. He asked
for direct taxes so that the state could force capitalists
to assume their responsibility of support to the government.
The above was what Dr. Sun Yat-sen thought to be Three
Peoples* Principles* What were the roles played by the two
political parties in the implementation of the legacies?
The following chapter is devoted to a statement of what the




WHAT THE COMMDHIST PARTY HAS DOHE POR CHIMA
The quest for nationalism. Democracy and Livelihood was
replaced hy totalitarianism. Dr. Sun Po, son of Dr. Sun Yat*^
sen, in April, 1944 warned his associates of the necessity
for reform.
; We must recognize that in the past we ourselves
unwittingly assumed the attitude and habits of a ruling
caste. The suppression of outside criticism against
our party by our own members bespeak this fact. The
number of our party members is less than 1 per cent
of the total population of the country. The Kuomintang
is an infinetesimal portion of the population. But we
have come to regard ourselves as if we were the sov¬
ereign power in the state, entitled to the enjoyment
of a special position and to suppress all criticism
against us.^
He felt that in order to build a democratic state China must
be granted freedom to discuss openly ideas, views and issues.
Public opinion in Great Britain and the Unites States
criticized China during early 1944* There was the belief
that China was becoming fascistlc with the Intent to establish
a dictatorship. Purther, Chiang used lend-lease supplies
to fight the Chinese vdien it was given to fi^t the Japanese.^
"Chungking Warned to be Democratic," Hew York Times,










Heedless to say that China had become by mid World War II
anything but democratic - most of the time was spent chasing
the Communists.^
The Chinese people were ready to follow any faction
that was going to improve their conditions. They only
accepted the program of the Communist party because it had
something to offer them. Due to the S3rmpathetlc attitude of
the people when it was a.pparent that Communist troops were
approaching them, it was more tha^n difficult for the
nationalist government to consolidate any captured area.^
China's government had denied the people Nationalism,
Democracy and Livelihood. These denials are better expressed
in the demands of ife-rshal Chang, a non-Comraunist, pro‘•National is t-
yet, enemy of Chiang. They are as follows:
(1) Reorganize the national government, (2) End all
civil war, and initiate resistance against Japan, (3)
Release the "National Salvation" leaders recently arrested
in Shan^ai, (4) Pardon all politics.! prisoners, (5)
Guarantee liberty of assembly, (6) Give the people a free
hand to express themselves patriotically, (7) Carry out
the will of Dr. Sim Yat-sen, and (8) Call a conference
immediately for "National Salvation.""
Marshal Chang told Chiang that his troops were tired of fi^t-
4
ing Chinese, that they were about to join the Communists.
John Gunther. Inside Asia (New York, 1947), p. 197.
2
"Reds Still Active in Yangtze Region," New York Times,
July 1, 1934, p. 8.
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It was Chiang’s telief that liheralism, parliament, cabinet
systems, presidential systems and other political proposals
of the Revolutionists were but copies of Western theories*^
These, he thou^t, were not good for China. He accused the
intellectuals of losing respect for things Chinese. Chiang
tried to explain that much of China’s chaos was due to the
inequalities of foreign treaties.^ Chiang’s regime was
responsible for C^ina entering many of the treaties.-
Very little had been done to implement Dr. Sun’s Three
People’s Principles by the iratione.liet Government. The
Communist party in China dedicated itself to reforms in every
respect. Its work began in 1924 when Dr. Sun proposed liberal¬
izing the Kuomintang.^ These efforts were exerted continously
until 1949. The Communist party has done more than the
nationalists to give China Rationalism, Democracy and Livelihood.
Less than four years after the break between the Communist
and Rationalists in 1927 the I-feinchurian conflict was well
underway. Japan invaded China. The Canton group that was
organized by Dr. Sun upon his return from exile was still in






Yaldiontoff, op. cit., p. 58.
31
in the South. It had lost all hope for co-operation with
the EuoBiintang.^ Attempts were made to organize a- Red army.
Rew techniques were introduced for working with the masses.
g
Such a program brought wholesale support from peasants.
There was a new discipline for this army. It was comprised
of three parts: (l) prompt obedience to orders, (2) no con¬
fiscations whatever from the peasants, and (3) prompt delivery
to the government (Communist), for its disposal of all goods
confiscated from the landlords.^ After 1928 eight other
disciplinary rules were Included as an inducement for peasant
support: (l) Replace all doors when you leave a house, (2)
Return and roll up the strav; Eiatting on which you sleep, (3)
Be courteous and polite to the people and help them when you
can, (4) Return all borrov/ed articles, (6) Be honest in all
tre.nsactions with the peasants, (7) Pay for all articles pur¬
chased, and (8) Be sanitary, and especially establish latrines
a safe distance from people’s houses.^ Chu Teh was commander
of the Chinese First Army Corps. The influence of the Red
Aniy spread rapidly throu^out Hunan. The influence placed
1








the prestige of CHiiang’s party in great jeopardy. There
were six Anti-Communist campaigns fou^t, the first of which
ended in defeat.^
Conditions became so oppressive until the Communist der
cided to depart for the Northwest. Their chief aim was to
defeat Japan (after the Marco Polo Bridge incident In 1937).^
”They had behind this desire a vision of a new China, powerful,
forward-looking, uncorruptible and free.”^ jhe Red Army march¬
ed 6,000 miles. It began in October, 1943, with 100,000 men
and completed the ma.rch one year later with 50,000 men.^ It
joined other Communists in Shensi who had come from Honan*
Yenan in Shensi became the capital of Red China.^ In the
Northwest behind Japanese lines v;ere set up Border governments.
These governments were established along the radical democratic
6
designs of Dr. Sun Yat-sen a,s proposed in his San Min Chu I.
V/hen the Communists moved into the Northwest and founded
their government at Yenan it v;as a revolutionary feat. China
1
YaMiontoff, op. cit., pp. 100-20.
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in that area was united* War was declared on Japan and the
United Front began.^ The leaders of the Red government were
O
Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. ifeo was Chairman of the Chinese
Communist party. He looked and acted like a peasant. He
was easy-going, docile, simple, precise and somewhat awkward
in his speech. Yet, he wore an expression of deep concentration
4
and clarity of mind vdxich portrayed him as an able statesman.
Chu Teh was Chief of the Communist Armies. He always wore a:
bri^t smilej he was cheerful with heavy lines of peasantry
marking his face. These features made him approachable and
5
loved by the army as well as the peeple. Their new govern-
g
ments around Yenan were wonders behind the Japanese lines.
A United Front against Japan was initiated. Vhat about the
politics in Yenan? To what extent was this new creation inside
China different from Chiang*s chaos? What was the program in
Yenan that formulated the materialization of Ur. Sun's
Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood?
1
Gunther, op. cit., p. 216.
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It has "been stated that at the founding of the Shensi
Border Governments a new nationalism was born.^ It was born
because the Communists had set up social and cultural move¬
ments in the Red Army: “ A publishing house employs 800 men
and issues a stream of textbooks} literacy in the Red Army
is uniquely hi^»''^ Education was the motto* They tried
Romanization of the language* barred opium* cooperatives were
encouraged, child marriages forbidden, radioes introduced,
athletics encouraged and Confucianism scorned because of its
emphasis upon a weak state.^ Medical facilities were more
adequate than in any other section of China*^ A university
was founded for v/omen and mass education was ahead of any
district of Chrina.® Cooperatives functioned well} tools were
smuggled from the outside*^
For peasants who wanted to till the soil they were given
plots on which to work.*^ Soldiers didn’t live by sweat of the
peasants. They had to work on farms.® Vang Chen* a Brigade
1
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comnander and Political Commissar with the Eighth Army on
February 5, 1944 issued this order:
In order out the duties of developing production,
guaranteeing supplies for the ai'my and the government,
of taking into account both public and private interests,
and of building up revolutionary property, so as to per¬
sist in unity with the people in armed resistance against
Japan and in the protection of the Border Region, the
following distribution of each member’s production,
estimated at an average of 2,440 pounds per head, is to
be carried but: 30 per cent for the self-supply of food
to this brigade; 4 per-cent for the self-supply of
clothing; 33 per cent for the food reserve fund of the
army; 33 per cent as each member’s private income which
on the basis of prevailing food prices, can be drawn
in cash and either invested in cooperatives against -
interest, remitted home, or used for personal needs.
The United Front against Japan was in operation but the
O
Communist continued to develop their political program.
”... Political evolution of the Border Region from the Com¬
munism of the Civil War days into a representative democracy
is perhaps the most significant feature of the Region’s
2
historyThe credo Mao Tse-tung was effectively adhered
to hy all Communists. Politics and social development were
his primary interests.
’’Especially in -China we must strictly distinguish between
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problems on one hand, and the practical policies of our new
Democracy on the other,.Vithout the new Democracy Mao
was afraid to put into effect his proposals. China needed
according to Mao:
(1) To drive the Japanese out; (2) to realize
democracy on a nationwide scale by giving the people
all the forms of modern liberty and a system of national
local governments elected by them in genuinely free and
general elections, which we have already done under our
control; and (3) to solve the agrarian question, so
that capitalism of a progressive character can develop
in China and improve the standard of living of the
people through the introduction of modern methods of
production.2
In 1938 the Border Regions began to carry out general elections
by use of the direct and secret ballots.^ The platform of the
party in this election was based upon the Three people’s
Principles.^
Because the platform expressed well the aims and intentions
of the Communists it was adopted by the People’s Council.®
The People’s Political Council was democratically elected by
a large number of the people. Their powers were different
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1945 of the eighteen members of the Border Region government,
only six were Communists. It v/as a policy of the party to
give position and power to non-memhers. Also the Communists
would submit to majority rule.^ Communists never occupied
more than one-third of the seats in the People’s Political
Council. If they were elected to more, the seats were auto¬
matically given up.^
After the long march to Yenan in Shensi the Communists
had given the people in Border Regions, land, schools, medical
facilities, democratically elected governments, and a spirit
4
of unity.' Efforts were made to broaden the reading public.
It was called "Popularizing” which meant that all writers
must create harmony and weld the interests of workers, peasants
5
and soldiers*
There was a greater Rationalistic spirit in Shensi than
there was in China because three governments ruled areas of
China during mid World War II. They were Chungking, (2)
Nanking, and(3) Yenan.® The Communists began to stress unity
for all of China as early as mid-World War II.^ Since Chiang’s
-
Porman, op* cit., up* 56-57.
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nationalist goTernment was the only one of the three
recognized hy all of the major powers^ the Communists made
o
their demands on Chungking for a unified China. These demands
were made because Chungking refused to adhere to promises of
reform which were: (1) *'The Government does not propose to
interfere with the personnel of the Communist Arms'", and (2)
The Government has promised to consider the removal of the
so-called blockade of the border area when agreement on the
other (above) is reached,"^ Chiang aggravated the condition
more by refusing to call a convention to form a new govern¬
ment.^ lfe,o (chairman of the Communist party) proposed that
this new government be a “democratic coalition government
in which all classes of the Chinese people would participate,
in that all classes would elect som.e forth or one hundred
delegates to organize the new government.®
These demands were refused by the nationalists. People
began mass movement into Communist territories. Ilarshal Yen
said that: "The reason why the Communists today have such
powerful forces is that so many people are following them.
_ . _
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And the reason vhy so many people are following them is that
our administration, the administration of the National Govern¬
ment is bad.”^ He then stated that the Communist government
"is good."^
¥hen it was apparent that the allies were to win the war
in early 1945, Chiang promised: (l) to call an assembly to
draft a constitution, and (2) to return the government tp the
people. The war continued since neither Japan nor Germany
had been defeated. Chiang refused to give the Communist
party any status in China.^ He made four proposals to the
Communists in an attempt to bring the Communist under his
Nationalist control. These were: (1) A readiness to recog¬
nize the Communist party as a lawful political party, (2)
Inclusion of high-ranking Communist - officials in the Military
Council (had no power), (3) Inclusion of representatives of
all members of political parties in a cabinet, and (4) es¬
tablishment of a committee to study reorganization of the
Communist Armies. These were rejected by the Communists be-
6
cause they wanted to Chinese people to elect these officials.
^Stein, op. cit.« p. 54.
^Ibld.
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"Chiang Pledges Democratic China Wien Enemy is Being
Out,” New York Times, January 1, 1945, p. 1.
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In 1945 General Hurley was Ambassador to China. His
ssion was to bring about more cooperation between the
tionalists and the Communists. He urged Chinese leaders
sit down and solve their problems.^
The aim of negotiation was to prevent further Civil War,
2
iwever, neither side could agree on any permanent compromise,
ijor points of disagreement were found in the Pive-Point
raft and the Three Point Draft agreement. The Communist
inted a united front against Japan under a coalition govern-
3nt elected by the people while Chiang wanted the Nationalist
jvernmsnt under him to powerGeneral Hurly felt that the
)mmunist proposals were the basic points of departure for
settlement of the disputes.^
Negotiations did not bring about too much cooperation,
a the meantime conditions in Shansi welcomed Communism.^
lansi had 130,000,000,000 tons of untouched grade coal, it
3.d fertile valleys and an industrial plant better than any
1 China. Yet misery existed. The Shansi peasants were
j— —
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especially knovm for their conserrative thriftiness* and for
their abilities as businessmen. Roads were interrupted in
the province, taxes became heavier and heavier as the
provincial government tended to increase its despotic rule
by secret police.^
In addition to deplorable events inside Shansi, a
financial crisis was suffered by China. It was due to the
o
bac^ardness of the banking structure* Citizens of the
United States had begun to feel that money given to Rationalist
China was being used to fi^t a war.^ Yet, in 1948 the China
Aid Act was passed the United States Congress.^ Chiang in
1949'asked that the war cease, that he would resign and think
nothing more about his position.^ The announcement did not
stop the Communists nor did the Chinese people cease their
Communist support. The city of Shan^ai was overrun by the
Red Army and the people danced and welcomed the red troops.®
A Communist victory had become certain early in 1949 when Red
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When Shan^ai surrendered there were reflections of new
)olitical changes such as a reduction in the number of types
if currency used in China.^ In May* 1949 a new Central Plains
tovernment was set up and headed by a council of twenty-one,
[t was elected by a Congress of 108 members.^ Seventy-one
nembers came from sub-areas, twenty-nine from various profes¬
sions, and ei^t from engineers, specialists, enlightened
gentry and industrialists*^
In 1949, Chiang left the mainland of China for Formosa*
3is armies were driven from the Chinese soil to Hainan and
Formosa. Before the General was established well in the
retreat his armies had to surrender Hainan*^
China by Hovember 1949 had incited the Mukden Incident
idaich stirred anger in the United S^iates. The Chinese had
arrested Ambassador Angus Ward and jailed him, then, informed
the United States afterwards.® China had come from a colony
to a national state vdiich was more when Chiang left for
Formosa*
j
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CHA.PTER IV
coircLusioir
It is evident that the Chinese CommunistB have driven
the forces of Nationalist China from the mainla-nd. Present¬
ly, a Nationalistic Communistic government rules China.
Nothing certain is to he said about it other than that the
government is a de facto one.
China has been somewhat freed from the West in that the
United States in 1943 gave up her extra-territorial grants:
Japan, being defeated in World War II, lost her cessions in
Shantung and the Liaotung Peninsula. But Britain is still at
Hong Kong and Prance is still in Prench Indo-China. Despite
these facts the Chinese Commi’nist government is now governing
more of the nation than did Chiang.
The country moves toward sovereignty. Two primary factors
are responsible for the Nationalistic growth: (1) the people
have their country with land to call their own, and (2) the
people feel that this regime is theirs. It appeared that the
Communists have given them Nationalism, Democracy and Liveli¬
hood. Communists leaders made it appear that they followed
Dr. Sun’s legacies throu^out their program. Ife-o would confer
with Chu Teh and Cou En-lai before acting on any major issue.
This gave no appearance of a dictatorship.
43
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The Communists hare driven out the foreigners except
in Hong Eong. There were a few Frenchmen in Shanghai when
the Coramianist entered in Kay, 1949» Nothing has been dis¬
covered as to their whereabouts in 1950.
Dr. Sun’s second principle was Democracy. He advocated
liberty for the state and a curtailment of it for the in¬
dividual. Yet, the people were to be consulted. Their
wishes were to be expressed by their participation in the
election of the officials.
Early, in Shensi, the Chinese Commimists permitted them
to elect the governmental officers. By doing so the Communist
could reject without losing peasant support any program
initiated by Chiang.
To assure Nationalism and Democracy it was necessary to
give the people land from which they could make a living.
Peasants were given land for which they began fitting in 1831.
They were given hospitals better than any in China. Univer¬
sities were created to enable the peasants to learn more about
the soil, government and world affairs. These according to
Joy Homer in her book Dawn Watch in China ^ are better than
any others in China. Gunther Stein in The Challenge of Red
C
China shows that an era of plenty existed where the Communisl
1
Homer, op. cit., pp. 219-25.
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d estalDlished thenselves. Everywhere the Communist armies
nt landed estates were broken up and given to the peasants.
Dr. Sun’s hope that the peasants would have food enough to
thstand an invader materialized when Chinese greeted Communists
Shansi in 1947 and at Shan^ai in 1949.
All of what has been said about the Communists in China is
ly temporarily true. The Communists have not yet set up a
vil government. It is still governed by the military* TJsual-
the Military and civilian governments rule differently,
tionalism, Democracy and Livelihood will be in China only
en and after the people have constituted a civil government.
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